CALL FOR PAPERS (JOLMA 6 | 1 | 2025)
Together: Non-Representational Accounts of Social Cognition
Editor: Carlos Vara Sánchez
For a long time, in philosophy of mind and psychology, the ‘theory-theory’ and the ‘simulation theory’ have been the predominant approaches in trying to explain how one understands and interrelates with other people. Proponents of the first set of theories argue that we use folk or common sense psychology to infer things about other people's mental states (Baron-Cohen 1995; Leslie 1991). On the other hand, those who endorse the second approach consider that we use our own mental activity to elaborate models of other people’s minds (Gordon 1986; Heal 1986). Despite relevant differences, both frameworks share some basic assumptions, such as the unobservability principle (Krueger 2012) —i.e., we need some extra-perceptual processes to gain knowledge from mental states— or the observational stance —i.e., we need to observe others to explain their behavior.
In the last decades, the situation has changed. The conversation has become more nuanced and complex. New frameworks have offered novel approaches to social cognition. Among the reasons for this change, we can mention the resurging of phenomenological (Merleau-Ponty 2012) and pragmatist theories of the mind (Dewey 1922), the consolidation of James Gibson’s ecological psychology (Gibson 1979), and the emergence of enactivism (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991). All these circumstances have brought renewed ideas, concepts, and perspectives to the debate. Compared to the theory-theory and the simulation theory, a common aspect contributed by these approaches is an emphasis on non-representational explanations of social cognition. Instead of private events such as simulations and inferences, we now find dynamic and action-oriented notions that are deeply embodied and embedded in the sociomaterial environment. Mentions of habits, resonance, attunement, constraints, affordances, or coordination are often found when discussing social cognition from a non-representational perspective in the work of Shaun Gallagher (2020), Anthony Chemero (2009), Giovanna Colombetti (2014), Reuben M. Baron (1980), Dan Zahavi (2014), or Thomas Fuchs (2018). However, there is still much to discuss in this field.
This issue of JOLMA intends to contribute to the debate on non-representational approaches to social cognition and their viability. We aim to collect both sympathetic and critical papers on this topic coming from a variety of philosophical and psychological perspectives. Possible topics might include (but are not limited to) the following:
- Limitations and strengths of non-representational approaches to social cognition;
- Direct perception and social interaction;
- On the possibility of higher-order social cognitive processes without representations;
- Tensions between ecological psychology and enactivism in social cognition;
- Social interaction;
- Non-representational dynamics of social cognition;
- On habits and affordances;
- Affectivity and intersubjectivity.
Invited contributors:
Laura Candiotto, University of Pardubice
Edward Baggs, University of Southern Denmark
Miguel Segundo-Ortín, University of Murcia
References
Baron, R. M. (1980). "Contrasting Approaches to Social Knowing: An Ecological Perspective”. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 6(4), 591–600.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Chemero, A. (2009). Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Colombetti, G. (2014). The Feeling Body: Affective Science meets the Enactive Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press
Dewey, J. (1922). Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
Fuchs, T. (2018). Ecology of the Brain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gallagher, S. (2020). Action and Interaction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gibson, J.J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton-Mifflinson.
Gordon, R.M. (1986). “Folk Psychology as Simulation”. Mind & Language, 1(2), 158-71.
Heal, J. (1986). “Replication and Functionalism”. IJ. Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind, and Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 135-50.
Krueger, J. (2012). “Seeing Mind in Action”. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 11, 149-73.
Varela, F.J., Thompson, E., and Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Zahavi, D. (2014). Self & Other. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Submission deadline: December 31th, 2024
Notification of acceptance: February 15th, 2025
Articles must be written in English and should not exceed 6,500 words (40,000 characters approx.). The instructions for authors can be consulted in the journal’s website: ‘Editorial Guidelines’.
Submissions must be suitable for blind review. Each submission should also include a brief abstract of no more than 650 words and five keywords for indexing purposes. Notification of intent to submit, including both a title and a brief summary of the content, will be greatly appreciated, as it will assist with the coordination and planning of the issue.
For any question, please contact: Carlos Vara Sánchez (carlosvarasanchez@gmail.com) or the journal (jolma_editor@unive.it)
About the journal
JoLMA is an Open Access journal (no APCs) indexed in Scopus, ERIH Plus, DOAJ. The Italian Ministry agency ANVUR recognizes it as a Classe A journal (11c4 and 11c5). Professor Luigi Perissinotto (Ca' Foscari Venice) is the editor-in-chief